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Economy and economics are parallel activities, sometimes associating 
with each other in dynamic, sometimes on the contrary. The economic thinking 
is likely to form its own schollar staff concomitantly with its own assertion of 
ideas. The economic integration, in such a context, stays a big project in way, 
but it still is much too early to talk about its (positive or negative) ending. Away 
from real effects produced and induced, this integration did for certain do one 
thing: a specific economics and economic thinking area.  
 
1. Basics of integration – Bela Balassa and Jacob Viner 
 
There is a rather interesting schollar names’ association to talk about. 
Firstly, Bela Balassa (1928-1991) was a Hungarian professor of economics that 
also aquired values of his country’s anty-communist revolution of 1956. Then, 
repression pushed him to leave his country first for Austria. And then, his 
scientific merits demonstrated in his economic graduation area
(1). It is in this 
context that he produced in 1961 his own model about the European 
integration, that was rather following its evolution eversince – a five steps 
process: (i) free exchange area, (ii) customs union, (iii) common market, (iv) 
economic union, (v) economic and monetary union
(2).  
This was estonishingly looking like a programatic document for the 
European Community and later Union and the European Commission should be 
really proud of this, if it had been its issuer. Actually, the Commission usually 
abstains from long term programmes issuing, theories and ideologies
(3).  
The Balassa’s teoretical contribution to the integration topic development 
was decissive. First of all, it is correct placing the free exchange area and 
customs union at the integration’s foundation and starting point, plus in their 
direct succession. Though, these two concepts were not quite „created” by the 
author, plus concepts arisen in the following model stages are – contrary to the 
earlier model stages’ description – rather arguable. Just taking into account 
those advanced stages as expected to come in place significantly later from the 
paper’s time (in early sixties)
(4). But Balassa succeeds something else about 
concepts of common (unique) market, economic and economic-monetary union: 
to become the parent of these titles eversince vehiculated by all, from the EU’s 
official documents to independent schollars, in their papers and debates.      
Secondly, I believe in another merit of Balassa, the one of detail matter 
and of a genius intuition that recalls the way that more than one hundred years 
earlier David Ricardo had foreseen the huge activity size of international trade 
as starting from the second part of the 19th century. Or, Balassa was doing 
something similar in 1961, be it indirectly – through the monetary union stage 
brought in the integration model – he foresaw the draw-back and decline of the The economic integration: concept and end of process 
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world-wide money order that was very well in place at the time of his 
elaboration. This is about, of course, the Bretton Woods international 
Agreement and international monetary system (IMS/1944-1971) – that was the 
successor of all, the last World War, economic crisis and international monetary 
system of the gold standard (Andrei, 2011). Once more, the presumtive 
monetary union of this European States’ formation could not be expected at that 
time, but as the retort of an equally presumtive doubtful evolving of the 
international money order. And that whereas the last was no longer at its timid 
start (1944), not yet in its later (1971) decline either. Just note for the effects 
area that the European Commission took its first range of monetary measures in 
1971, exactly ten years from the Balassa’s elaboration. Back in 1961, the 
Bretton Woods IMS really was on its upward evolving, be it for its short period, 
as seen from today.  
The other schollar name associated with the basics of the European 
integration was coming from the other side of the Atlantic
(5). This is Jacob 
Viner (1892-1970), a Canadian citizen of Romanian origin that attended a 
fruitful university professor of international trade career at Princeton 
University. Unlike Balassa, Viner focuses on the incipient  part of the 
integration process and stays in the universal economic thinking with his theory 
of the customs union (Viner, 1950). The schollar reveals that the international 
economy – and especially a States’ formation platform initiative and procedure 
of this type – is succeptible of producing (among other things) the opposite 
effects of trade creation and trade perversion. So, despite his limiting analysis 
to the incipient integration of his time, the schollar here found, especially in 
trade perversion type phenomena, another larger area of phenomena that belong 
to the contradictory characteristic of all integration phases and developments all 
over. See in later years (since 1999-2002) the example of contredictions 
between the Euro Area and the rest of EU Member States, or the one of the EU 
extension toward its eastern geographic side (2004 and 2007), versus the “No!” 
vote against the project of European Constitution on the western (old) side of 
the Union. See equally the essence contrediction between reinforcement of the 
Union through its enlargement and its opposite weakening by diluting the 
overall integration degree. See also the multiple contredictions broght in by the 
Common Agricultural Policy (Programme) and so on. 
Viner, at his time, was just finding the example of the injust advantage of 
the inside the Union firms producing and exporting to inside the Union 
consumers, over all other producers, consumers, State governments and other 
categories of interests competing in the same area. But my point is that 
miningless irony and speculations, as presumable on the Viner’s demonstration 
so should be rejected
(6) in favour of a true tragic condition of this process – the Liviu C. Andrei 
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initiator States always feel committed to express attachement to market, 
competition and all liberal values whereas integration itself comes to undermine 
them in facts, by its proper functioning.  
As summarising from above, there were two schollar names that founded 
the theory of European integration in the immediate post-World War Two years 
(fifties and early sixties), as „classics” of this topic. A substantial specific 
bibliography was gathered eversince, so that we currently live as the generation 
that feels forced to do two things, in alternative: revise or reject such a theory.      
             
2. Criticism of the Balassa Model  
 
Recall from above the very „genius” of Balassa, claimed for the last 
integration stage identified in his model on the (economic and) monetary union. 
Ironically, the arguable part of the author’s elaboration arises from the same 
part of the paper.  
 (1) First of all, now, in 2012, the economic and monetary union is done, 
as the common currency does its job for one decade time already – can anybody 
assert that the integration process is also done, be it as restricted on the Euro-
Zone?! I mean not at all and some authors argue that the monetary approach 
currently overpasses the real economic evolving (Dinu et al., 2004). Besides, a 
fiscal approach is expected to knock at the EU’s door, as similarly to the 
monetary one once in the past. Plus, it is the shame that Balassa did not 
approach any of fiscal aspects of the integration, all the less as for a distinct 
stage, as properly to his view.  
 (2) Second, the author seems to have missed here another genius ability – 
let us admit that he has foreseen at least the common currency’s birth (1999-
2002), as equivalent to the monetary union stage of his model; or that such a 
stage could extend to the earlier Maastricht Treaty of the Union (1992), with its 
“Convergence Criteria”. But, there is an obvious mistake: the last were drawn 
by the European Monetary Institute (EMI), the predecessor of the today 
European Central Bank (ECB). And whereas the last relates to the common 
currency period, the previous had also enough to do with the earlier EMS 
(Andrei, 2009a). An EMS that came up as the retort to its precedent “Monetary 
Snake” of the early seventies. Or, can this context be fully and properly 
understood ? The meaning of this tissue of facts and events is that the monetary 
approach is far from similar to “the last stage’ of the Balassa’s paper of 1961 – 
no common currency of the two centuries’ joining as possible without its 
previous EMS of the eighties, and the same EMS cannot ignore the earlier 
“Monetary Snake” either. Actually, the common currency was coming up as the 
very solution for a previous IMS in collapse danger (McKinnon, 1992) – as The economic integration: concept and end of process 
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similar structure with the Bretton Woods IMS that had imploded in 1971 
(Triffin, 1973).   
It is true that the other report, the one between EMS and “Monetary 
Snake”, was a little different story. The „Snake” was the fastest reaction tool 
available to Europeans against the sick dollar floating of 1971, whereas 
previously, the treaties of Rome (1957) – basing the Community-Union – 
hadn’t mentioned any about money. Later on, during the “Snake”
 ’s working, 
Europeans realised the sad paradox of their dependence on the US – at least, as 
for a weakening monetary reference – at the same as previously – when the US 
had been strong, as during the War and at the end of it. That was why they 
started working on the next EMS, but so, on the other hand, Balassa both 
reached his genius of foreseeing the forthcoming monetary union earlier than 
the EC-EU and made the mistake of shrinking this to the “last stage” of the 
integration process. By both aspects, the EU integrated and an independent 
researcher on its evolution do obviously split up from each other. And 
concomitantly, the very truth here revealing is that the “Monetary Snake” 
(1971) was becoming the starting point of the monetary approach of the 
European Integration.   
(3) This above is the reasoning of recognising the monetary approach of 
the EU as a long-term one, and so the monetary approach was working 
concomitantly with other objectives and approaches of the integration, like the 
common market, so trade and even some fiscal approaches – see the VAT 
unifying in order to fight the injurious fiscal competition among Member States. 
But the same reasonoing has two parts – the second one “attacks” the 
structure itself of the Balassa’s description, the stages construction idea. Or, it 
might be correct keeping a stage view on the incipient parts of the integration 
like the free trade area and customs union – they might be able to fill the 
beginning and come in a proper succession with one-another. But things are 
different for the common (unique) market and economic-monetary union: there 
cannot be similar “stages”, as long as built on various objectives, but they stay 
valid concepts. Actually, the very weak point of the Balassa’s shaping view on 
the European integration seems to be its “stages” idea, together with too much 
separation between successive stages, as also criticized by Tsoukalis (2000).   
 (4) In reality, the Balassa’s five stages – or six stages, as also taking into 
consideration the above presumtive fiscal approach aren’t able to cover the 
European integration description, but just the liberal face of it. And a precision 
here comes as necessary on the EU’s integration project, as out of ideologies
(7) 
–  not even the “free market” here qualifies as basic ideology, but the free 
economy is approached in a verry pragmatic way: no possible integration 
approach out of a common market! The last also might limit to just a tool of Liviu C. Andrei 
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fulfilling other targets and ojectives – see the ones related to welfare and social 
cohesion. As in theory, integration feels free to become a very „socialist” 
undertaking – and that might explain its popularity for the socialist and social-
democrat political thinkings, as in detail and against the old communism here 
viewing only the “contemporary capitalism” with its “internal and self-
destructing contredictions”.  
Or, this above digression is for clarifying the integration as (much) more 
than building a “larger market economy for its welfare benefits”. The Balassa’s 
model sees itself overpassed by facts, as correspondingly, but previously 
overpassed on the objectives area. The European integration economics 
identifies from its very beginning with “two economics”: (a) the one of liberal 
values – free trade, common market, competition, economic union, optimum 
currency area etc. –  and (b) the other, non-liberal – see concepts of: 
budget(ing), interventionism and policies, regional and sustained development, 
social cohesion, structural funds etc. Moreover, the two ranges of concepts 
specifically play for: objectives (b) and instruments (a), but even more 
interesting to be revealed is that the Union’s two economic faces of the 
integration commits itself to work concomitantly: meaning, the (b) objectives 
group of concepts isn’t concieved to expect the (a) liberal performances to be 
achieved. In our view, this might be taken as a generous mentality that worth as 
much as the idea of integration.        
  
3. A new retort picture of the European integration  
 
Bela Balassa ought to remain the parent of the European integration 
economics eversince his model elaborated in 1961. The age of this paper just 
requires its criticism and revising, as developed above, and the below lines just 
come to put the same ideas into a consistent and more comprehensive picture 
description, the one in which enough items of the primary (Balassa’s) descript-
tion will keep their initial validity and significance. First of all, as concluded 
above, it is the previous “five stages” idea that comes to be dropped out.  
 
3.1. Just two big stages, instead of the previous “five” 
 
The first two stages of the Balassa’s model – (i) free trade area and (ii) 
customs union – worth to be kept as such, plus they can be atributed to a larger 
stage now to be called incipient integration. The primary argument for such a 
reconsideration consists in the double appropriateness of these sub-stages for 
both the “zero moment” of integration and their succession between, as 
underlined above. But there is one more equally significant argument to be The economic integration: concept and end of process 
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considered: the other part of the integration will so come to be called as 
advanced integration and so will regard the other set of Balassian concepts – 
other than free trade area and customs union – in a larger view, as below 
explained:  
(1) This will make distinct the European type integration (see European 
Community that  once became European Union) from the other States 
Formations of integration aimed throughout the world. This is finally succeding 
to explain the more than one hundred States enlargement of the integration 
undertakings world-wide, as opposite to a certain “impopularity” of the 
European type integration of the EC/EU born once in fifties. The EU’s 
development did coexist with similar State formations initiatives born in North 
Africa, Middle East, other Arab zones, Central and Latin Americas (Andrei, 
2009a).    
There is even a two integration types’ simultaneity on the same European 
continent since (beside the EU) the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) equally 
exists. Currently, this States association have enough weakened, but the 
Europe’s recent economic history reveals significant moments in which the EC 
and EFTA were comparable sizes and so the two integration types were 
preserving individual specifics as even more obviously – see the time before the 
UK’s accession to the EC.      
Besides, there is a kind of “asymetry” to talk about as between – not 
exactly the two types, but about – the two philosophies of integration that lay 
behind. Both integration types contain what was already called above the 
incipient integration, but this is quite different for each: the one (EU) takes it at 
incipient integration in a long term evolving concept; the other (the EFTA type) 
takes the same (free trade area & customs union) as the whole integration 
process without any evolving on long term programmes and time horizons.    
This above explanation already expresses something about integration in 
its restricted and large senses. For a full view about the large sense economic 
integration, there is one more step to be accounted: here including the 
integration out of States formation. This is about IMS again, here including 
older monetary unions and even the so called international gold standard 
(Metzler, 2006).   
(2) The frontier between incipient and advanced integrations – as seen 
from the EU side – is also the one between the integration moments or type in 
which Member States can leave the Union whenever national interest or so 
might require as such – and such facts really occured (Andrei, 2009a) –, and a 
European Union situation in which such an initiative reduces to strictly 
hypothetical (theoretical or impossible) – and there still is no case, despite 
plenty of vicisitudes of the process evolving.     Liviu C. Andrei 
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  (3) Thirdly, it is about the difference between an incipient integration 
dominated by the Member States’ initiative – as political, administrative, 
diplomatic and in international law terms and as an alternative internationalisation 
– and, vis-a-vis an advanced integration in which it is the events that put pressure 
on the States’ initiative and concomitantly the internationalising aspect wipes out 
slowly but irreversibly. There might here be repeated the example of the same 
monetary approach developed by the EU:  the “Monetary Snake” of early seventies 
was proving more or less necessary for the post-Bretton Woods international 
pressing context and/or the integration evolving, whereas the folowing EMS (1979-
1999) and especially the common currency implementation (1999-2002) proven 
increasingly needed (Andrei, 2010)
(8). Meanwhile, the advanced integration of 
EC/EU was entered as in facts; the need for fiscal union seems to reiterate context 
in the post-common currency implementation time (Andrei, 2009b).   
To be added to these above that reshaping the integration dynamic on two 
stages also wipes the primary model’s frontiers between each of stages – a 
complex inter-condition of integration components of every development 
moment comes instead. The true separation between the newly settled “two 
stages” rather consists in:    
  the incipient integration basing on the customs union picture; customs 
union together with its precedent free trade area are the key concepts of 
this section; 
  the  advanced integration basing on the common (unique) market 
concepts; economic convergence and optimum currency area are the 
key concepts of this other section (Andrei, 2009a).    
 
3.2. The optimum currency area 
 
There is a new precision to be made: the optimum currency area (OCA) 
isn’t to be mixed up with terms like “Euro-Zone”, economic-monetary union 
and “the seventies” (that all mean the same). The OCA is a Mundell-
McKinnon(Mundell, 1961, McKinnon, 1992) origin concept that translates an 
open view upon the euro currency – as a nominal anchor -- outside the Euro-
Zone and even outside the EU area – as contrary in a way to the integration 
trend that economically “closes” the integrated area.     
 
3.3. The “non-liberal” Union 
 
Recall from the above first paragraph end the idea of the “second 
European economics”. It is paradoxical that an European Union once started 
from a hundred percent political initiative currently keeps no political thinking The economic integration: concept and end of process 
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bias, not even for the presumable “free market” ideology – recall that 
communist regimes, acting contrary to this ideology, were continuously 
emphasising their ideology and its “superiority” together with every programme 
option on all time terms, but also recall how strongly the same States, as post-
communist States in the early nineties had acted as contrary, for the market 
economy. The EU slightly, even unnoticely skipped all debates between 
liberalism and its opposite, here prefering the pragmatic logic: market and 
corresponding competition stay sine qua non needed to ensuring economic 
efficiency, growth-development and welfare producing; though, it is the same 
for differentiations of all kind resulting from market functioning: see regional, 
individual and for groups on all performings. But the essential difference is 
between these differentiations acting within a national territory or within a 
States integrated area: the last faces as much danger of des-integration, as its 
member States were initially free for their joining together.    
The solution here found to the unacceptable welfare and development 
inter-States and inter-regions differentiation is the one of Tsoukalis (2000) type 
– see “accomplishing the customs union’s aims by the (next) common market 
stage structure”. In a similar order, the liberal approach’s inconvenients are 
assumed to be fought by the other non-liberal one – namely, through 
interventionism, policies, here including structural and social policies, funds, 
including structural funds, and approaches. Concretely, the non-liberal regional 
development is aimed to correct social inconvenients of the liberal approach of 
the common-unique market.     
 
4. The current development of the European integration  
 
And recall the last lines above for stressing the idea that even a 
presumable perfect market functioning would be assumed to induce problems in 
the social area. But our common market isn’t achieved either and despite the 
highest degree of integration within the Euro-Zone and EU area ever atteint as 
world-wide, there is still enough to do about (Yves Thibault de Silguy, 1998).    
 
4.1. Imperfections of the unique market: a general view 
 
We just mentioned about the Euro-Zone and EU, and the idea of a 
difference in terms of integration degrees already starts clarifying. However, the 
same is similarly about within the Euro-Zone alone, as properly called 
“economic and monetary union” in the Balassa’s terms – member national 
economies are not (yet) perfectly convergent between each-other and individual 
economies still work in different phases of the business cycle. The current Liviu C. Andrei 
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international economic crisis
(9), in a complete and so correct evaluation on the 
European area, is certainly much more than some States’ negligent over-
indebtness – at least, this might hide a precipitate States’ intervention on 
compensating hugely imbalanced private capital outflows and it will be their 
causes to be searched the really relevant point. Differences in national member 
States’ economic competitiveness are certainly causing part of this kind of 
current phenomena – and this might become a new example for the Balassa’s 
model’s error on placing the common market as the third-intermediary stage of 
the integration developing.    
Whereas these above suggest economic imperfections of the unique 
market, there are also to be highlighted aspects of the opposite side of the so far 
integration developed. See just a few of these as obvious as not looking 
favourable to all parts. A first example might be the foreign direct investments 
(FDI) inflows in the Central-Eastern European (CEE) countries, as former 
candidate countries to joining the Union – the old member countries of the EU, 
and especially the today Euro-Zone member countries had been dominant in the 
Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries’ FDI portfolio for a good while. 
Then, in the 2004 and 2008 waves of the EU extending to its Eastern side, the 
same FDI flows sharply dropped down (Andrei, 2008). Or, the explanation of 
such an event starts where FDI are likely to be considered the internalization of 
the international competition imperfections and white spots – joining the unique 
market and its competition curb the FDI process and flows and they are 
expected to lower even on longer terms.       
Another example comes as related to what is happening to the FDI 
Western-Eastern flow of the EU region, as a whole: some multinationals move 
their fillials within the EU region or off, for the same profound reason of the 
regional market competition regaining that throughs out the previous investor’s 
specific advantages in a country, region or part of the region – see the examples 
of prevoiously lower wages and salaries and/or (basic) prices of raw materials 
in the host countries, as compared to the FDI source countries, that vanished in 
time
(10). And the list of examples is enough able to continue here, but more 
important to be here extracted is that an imaginable “perfect competition” on 
the EU (or just Euro-Zone) market would get similar to the image that David 
Ricardo had on the international trade about two century time ago: producers 
and exporters of the region would easy work just home and get their revenue 
and good profit on a stable price area, no investing abroad – now, within the 
Union region – needed and existent fillials would be eliminated – or re-directed 
abroad, into the rest of the world, as alternatively, for the Union’s case.      
 
 The economic integration: concept and end of process 
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4.2. Post-economic and monetary union  
 
Now recall our old approach of the fiscal union and its comparison to the 
already done monetary approach (Andrei, 2009b). This is the advanced 
integration phase, the one in which Europe already becomes a distinct space in 
this world and the one in which – see the above (2) paragraph – there are events 
pressing on national initiatives of the EU Member States (Andrei, 2009a). The 
monetary approach took several decades to bring in the common currency and 
so the last stage of the Balassa’s model. But there might be also another debate 
in this picture: could this monetary union stage be only common currency 
based, and not alternatively base on national currencies – as in the EMS picture, 
that was also able to support a coordinated behaviour of those currencies ? So, 
the conceptual entity difference between the one-common and plural money 
that is the national currencies alternative is one of the most obvious things in 
the today Europe, as similar as the Balassa’s model’s frontier between stages.      
In other words, the frontier between EMS and common currency – nearby 
the larger one between the incipient and advanced integration phases – 
witnesses that only the common currency drags in the central bank type 
authority for the Union, that is the EBC. The last “absorbs” the central banks of 
the Euro – Zone Member States into its subordination, more or less as in the 
American Federal Reserves’ way and keeps as primary political objective the 
price stability inside the Zone – actualy, this is the Euro currency’s 
management before all. In such an order, this is the specific banking status and 
what all central banks do for their aferrent territories (national and/or federal) in 
the post-war and present economy – this is the ECB for Euro and the Euro – 
Zone, as well. 
Or, despite already told (Andrei 2009b; 2010), it has to be reiterated that 
this is the very key institution of the newly advanced phase of the integration. 
The presumable full status of the  economic and monetary union’s central bank 
equally includes an equal part cooperation with  the Union’s (...) government – 
as well as in all State and State federation types structures. Or, here there is the 
specific of our Union and the way that events push States’ initiatives and facts 
in the current period: the ECB here works together with Member States’ 
governments (instead of the Union’s government). All central banks face 
enough difficulties in this corporatist way of “equal part” relationship with 
corresponding government – in the same order, but different circumstances, it is 
even harder for  the ECB to deal with a number of national governments in 
managing the common currency. The Member States’ governments have 
neither a common agreement to represent them vis-a-vis the ECB, nor any other 
formal structure that could make them a consistent and unitary whole – the truly Liviu C. Andrei 
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rational lonely alternative of this “vicious plurality” here remains the Union’s 
Government that formally is the European Commission (EC).            
Or, the last exerts a kind of “residual” governing, as regarding the 
common currency management, despite that the EC, as all governments in this 
world, subordinates the Union’s budget activity – this is not just formal, but real 
fact, as taken together with that the EU’s budget is itself a “residual” budget in 
the area. Its tasks limit to funding some EU’s policies, here including the 
Common Agricultural Programme (CAP) and regional-sustained development. 
The ECB’s, EC’s and EU’s budget’s inter-relationships disclose that, despite 
the high stage of integration currently developing on this continent, the real 
political power inside this Union belongs to individual Member States, as 
similarly to the pre-integration moments of the immediate post-War and even to 
pre-War times. And there are not even all EU Member States fairly sharing this 
political power, but super-powers come back on their old positions. See 
especially the crucial moments of this international financial crisis, in which no 
EU’s voice, but the ones of Germany and sometimes of France. 
Thirdly, the same EC, ECB and EU’s budget context here rises a question 
that comes for the first time in the world history: To whom the common 
currency really belong? Alternative answers naturally being: Member States or 
their Union legal entity. Whether the answer points to the previous, this is what 
we actually have and our above description points to a tissue of contredictions 
of, plus an expectable come-back of the national currencies, be it the way of the 
former EMS – but this is just shifting two sets of contredictions, the current one 
here above described and the former one related to the nominal anchor, as 
perishable and so condamned as much as it already was once; this would be just 
a turning the history clock back.  
Alternatively, whether the answer to that question points to the Union, 
this is the direction that current events press this time in. First, the EC will 
strengthen and the Union will so become a federative government structure; the 
EU’s budget will strengthen at the same by its restructuring from its current 
residual state; but budget relates to the fiscal system, that here implies the fiscal 
union, as the exact financial translation of this new order of facts starting from a 
Union capable to manage its own currency
(11). It is certain that this new post-
monetary approach will take a new couple of decades and the political power 
structure is here assumed as drastically restructuring (Andrei, 2009b), but the 
unknown of this development remains in the Union’s authority’s specific 
weight – the one currently feeding a good part of the already born and vivid 
Euro-skepticism throughout the area.  
Both alternative options are now called to answer a common question: 
“Believing or not in this (kind of) integration?” The presumable answers, in my The economic integration: concept and end of process 
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view, will come specifically close to the ones related to the current crisis: did 
integration contribute to this, in its own way? Does the “Euro-Zone crisis” 
prove the uncosistency or incomplete EU’s monetary approach up to 2002? Is 
the presumable fighting of this crisis assumed to step on the integration’s 
requirements, or, on the contrary, to stop or step-back from this process, as a 
false and injurious future?           
 
5. About the proper end of the integration process  
 
Recall from above that the alternative non-EU and EFTA type integration 
is likely to exclude any terms of development, evolution and long-term; on the 
contrary, the EU integration sees its contradictory development in each Balassa 
model’s stage, moment and important zone of acting. Since the wrong answer 
about ending integration together with implementing the monetary union, the 
same question authomatically re-rises. It is for a paper like this, basing on the 
primary integration model’s criticizing, to complete by its own answer. So, 
when the European integration would be assumed as fulfilled?   
Unfortunately, it isn’t yet the moment of such an answer, but the one of 
other two preliminary precisions. Firstly, as this EU type integration overpasses 
the economic area of judgement, the same for this moment that is here searched 
for. Secondly, there will be an economic, administrative and governing 
structure to talk about and here recall the way that – on another plan of the same 
facts – even democracy shouldn’t be called to renew or re-invent its forms. So 
the governing structure, that fits both the integration’s appropriate end, as 
aimed, and democracy preserved on appropriate and veryfied forms. Let us 
recall that today the EU proved original in the “right way” by succeding to 
implement this new type of currency, but its “originality” now prolongates to 
the “wrong way” of supporting it in the default of some basic tools of the latest, 
like treasury, central budget and certainly, a well to do government working this 
way in context.        
The conclusion on this above is just one: the States-federative structure; 
no alternative end of the process, except for continuing on an endless 
contradictory context and series of facts – or these facts include the current 
situation in which the EU documents seem to avoid any debate and perspective 
analysis about, here including the fiscal union hypothesis. The end and 
accomplishment of integration is supposed to come when no any more 
contradictory pressure of events. As for the past, this new States formation was 
born conversely than all the other State or federation entities of the world: the 
central bank – monetary authority – first, for a government – political  authority – 
to come later on, and this to play “equal part” with the monetary authority for Liviu C. Andrei 
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managing the formation’s money. This formation would be expected to reach 
its own identity step by step and this is institutionally complete when there will 
be all: government, central bank, money, strong budget and unitary taxation – 
or, at least this is what we can currently see around. Of course, the unitary 
taxation identifies with the fiscal union, in which’s picture taxes will be paid to 
Brussels first, and then to Bucharest, Sofia and Berlin, and these latter as rather 
local taxes, in a new Union’s fiscal structure – all these meaning that 
reinforcing the Union means something we don’t like to call “re-centralization”.    
The last – directly meaning shifting the State authority position to the 
second level of power – is, more precisely, what strenghtens the contrary 
pressures of Euro-skepticism, nationalism and anty-Unionism. We live in the 
period in which these opposite pressures – in favour and contrary to the 
integration achieved – seem rather comparable, but this might remain 
meaningless for even the immediate future – here recall that once, in sixties and 
early seventies the non-EU type integration seamed more successfull even in 
Europe, events went in the contrary sense just when even the today EU was just 
incipient integration itself at that time. The present is still able of producing 
enough surprises, in its turn. 
That is why, once getting certain that the current trend of the EU type 
integration leads to the States-federative structure, I personally do not dare to 
really bet on such a future as similarly – the mass of current and next future 
devolopments is able to contain enough unexpected and unexpectedly powerful 
items acting in all possible directions. See the today crisis moments in which, 
on the one hand, the Union looks stepping back to national (i.e. German) power 
re-assertion, on the other the recent Fiscal Treaty – that might be able to be a 
right start on the long way towards the presumable fiscal union, as advanced 
integration on its old continuous way – came up as sustained by even the same 
German super-power in the area.  
Finally, instead of a „prophecy” in the matter of European integration, let 
me have two more ideas below in this paper: the one is for a certain aspect, the 
other reveals another unknown. As for certainty, it is sure that a presumable 
integration advance on isn’t to be taken as an “utopia” of the “old times”, and 
foreseeing or expecting the federative structure in place would be no longer an 
issue of personal support or ideological option either, in a zone expected to 
sharp feelings at least on these both sides. Concretely, the Union is a new entity 
joining a political game together with the State entities, local public 
administrations and citizens and their groups. Or, this larger context would even 
allow the Union to act in favour of public administrations, regions and/or 
citizens in a kind of “theory of games” against the Member States’ authority – 
as by consequence, citizens might not necessaryly deplore the national The economic integration: concept and end of process 
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authority’s political step back or hate the “supranational” idea when seeing their 
own interests in dynamics.  
As for less certainty, recall from above the unique market’s evolving. 
This is certainly the liberal part of the process, that is why this looks sometimes 
contredictory, other times silent advance and with no direct and visible linkages 
with the here above debated institutional developments. Market gives form to 
the European region’s demand-supply on long terms and, irrespective of 
institutional developing, its component (segment) industries act on more or less 
market competition.      
 
 
Notes 
 
(1)  See a career that followed at the Yale University, at the World Bank, as consultant, and 
finally as a professor at the John Hopkins University (Wikipedia).  
(2)  According to B. Balassa: Towards a Theory of Economic Integration, Kyklos International 
Review for Social Sciences, 17 pages, 1961. See also Balassa (1961).   
(3)  In the comminist style, as for instance.  
(4)  And such an aspect comes to be deepened and detailed in the below paragraphs of this 
paper.   
(5)  The curious anecdotic detail is that both classics of the European integration economics 
(Balassa and Viner) have fulfilled their scientific careers out of Europe, on the Northern 
American continent.  
(6)  See a rather journalist speculation on such “companies taking an unfair profit” from the 
integration process for really concluding that it was just them initiating a whole integration, 
as very “convenient” for their own “restraint interests” etc.    
(7)  Here recall the old communist ideology joining specific long term programmes of such a 
type.  
(8)  Let us repeat that it twas about the imminent collapse of all IMS founded on the nominal 
anchor that would be the national currency of a Member State (McKinnon, 1992).  
(9)  That deserves at least a distinct description, like the one of this paper.  
(10) There is to be understood that the FDI condition is as complex and large that these basic 
prices can be taken as just part of it (Andrei, 2008).   
(11) The way that simply relates to the correspondence between the aimed money-price stability – 
the one that also includes a balanced depreciation on longer terms – to a maximum budget 
deficit of 3%, as related to the annual GDP.  
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